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Despite the usual presumption for the territorial application of secu-
rities laws, U.S. courts have applied domestic antifraud provisions
extraterritorially to transactions in other countries, justifying its ac-
tions as necessary to protect U.S. investors and the integrity of US.
markets. The current approaches of US. courts, however, have
some problematic features. The scope of federal jurisdiction is in-
consistent and expansive, and this results in conflicts with other
countries and the potential for redundant and unnecessarily costly
systems of overlapping regulations. Because courts are not well
suited to analyze the various delicate issues related to the applica-
tion of antifraud rules, this Article affirms the proposition that Con-
gress should grapple with the issue of extraterritoriality and provide
the judiciary with clear guidance as to the proper reach of the anti-
fraud provisions. Moreover, believing that the current effects and
conduct tests of the courts give us practical approaches to decide the
reasonable scope of extraterritoriality, this Article makes some rec-
ommendations for the scope of extraterritorial subject-matter juris-
diction by suggesting modified and narrowed effects and conduct
tests.
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INTRODUCTION
As securities markets have become increasingly globalized in
recent years, the growth of transactions in cross-border securities
raises an issue of the regulation of transnational securities fraud.
Although surging capital across jurisdictional boundaries seems
to suggest that national borders are artificial constructs, this
circumstance does not comport with regulatory reality. It is an
internationally recognized principle that the power to prescribe
and enforce securities laws is territorial,' and most modem
securities markets are regulated on a national basis.2 The
securities regulations of most countries, in fact, reach only some
transactions and not others, and the same may be said of U.S.
securities laws.3 Viewed differently, however, securities laws are
hardly territorial at all because no country formulates the content
of its securities laws without considering the practices of its sister
countries and the extraterritorial effects of their laws.4 In regard
to the limits of a nation's power to unilaterally regulate conduct
that occurs outside of its borders, there is general agreement that
laws may have some extraterritorial reach.S
Enforcement of U.S. securities laws against securities fraud
produces special problems when persons alleged to have violated
the laws are foreign or when securities transactions that are
1. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules for International Securities
Transactions?, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1179, 1181-82 (1998); James D. Cox, Premises for
Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 11, 28 (2000) [hereinafter Cox, Reforming the Regulation of Securities
Offerings].
2. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global
Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and
Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (1999).
3. See, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW
170 (1998).
4. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of
International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 157 (1992);
James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1200, 1201 (1999) [hereinafter Cox, Regulatory Duopoly].
5. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1202 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter COX, SECURITIES REGULATION].
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allegedly tainted with fraud are foreign in nature.6 While the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or
"Commission") has taken a number of steps to define the scope of
disclosure requirements with respect to foreign companies and
conduct that occurs primarily abroad,7 the extraterritorial reach of
the antifraud provisions remains a matter for the courts to
resolve.8 Despite the usual presumption for the territorial
application of securities laws,9 U.S. courts have applied domestic
antifraud provisions extraterritorially to transactions in other
countries, justifying its actions as necessary to protect U.S.
investors and the integrity of U.S. markets.10  The current
6. See, e.g., 2 J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 12-6
(Indiana Univ. School of Law-Bloomington 2001) (on file with author)
[hereinafter HCKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION]. Generally,
enforcement of U.S. securities laws can take at least four different forms:
(1) private litigation where defrauded persons seek damages, rescission of
contracts, and/or equitable relief; (2) SEC enforcement actions against
registered companies or registered market intermediaries, such as broker-
dealers, in administrative proceedings or against any person involved in
fraudulent activities in judicial proceedings; (3) criminal actions by the U.S.
Department of Justice in a U.S. federal court; and (4) SRO actions to sanction
members for violations of SRO rules which have been approved by the SEC.
Id. at 12-8.
7. The SEC has provided a separate integrated disclosure system for
foreign private issuers that accommodates the desires of non-U.S. companies to
raise capital in the United States. New Accounting Rules Facilitate SEC Filings by
Foreign Registrants (stating that in order "[t]o facilitate the growth in the number
of foreign companies gaining access to U.S. markets, the SEC provides a
separate integrated disclosure system for foreign private issuers."), at
http://www.foreigncompanylisting.com/sec.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
Also, the SEC adopted a more restrained approach through Regulation S for
offers and sales taking place outside the United States. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905
(2003).
8. See Cox, SEcuRrTIEs REGULATION, supra note 5, at 1201.
9. The principle of international law calls for such territorial application of
securities laws. See Cox, Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings, supra
note 1, at 28 n.72 (stating that "[t]he territorial principle of international law
calls for determining jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce by reference to the
place where the act or offense occurs.").
10. See Michael J. Calhoun, Comment, Tension on the High Seas of
Transnational Securities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 679, 680 (1999); PHILIP R. WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS,
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 361 (1995) ("There is nothing new about the
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approaches of U.S. courts, however, have some problematic
features. The scope of federal jurisdiction is inconsistent and
expansive, and this results in conflicts with other countries and
the potential for redundant and unnecessarily costly systems of
overlapping regulations. Given the possibility of being sued
based on the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud
provisions, participants in cross-border transactions need an
identifiable standard to guide their actions.
Based on these problematic features of the current
extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction, this Article reassesses
the current approaches of U.S. courts and seeks to determine
what U.S. policy should be toward the regulation of cross-border
securities fraud. Part I examines the current antifraud provisions
of U.S. securities laws and subject-matter jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. Part II addresses the propriety of the extraterritoriality of
U.S. securities laws and articulates the problems with the current
extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction. Part III examines the
procedural devices currently available for confining the broad
reach of subject-matter jurisdiction. Part IV makes
recommendations for reform of extraterritorial subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I. THE CURRENT REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES
FRAUD
A. Antifraud Provisions Under the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act
The Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act")" contains
three antifraud provisions. 12 Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) provide
application of domestic laws to foreign transactions in the economic field.
Antitrust law, exchange control regulations, and economic sanctions are cases
in point.").
11. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000) [hereinafter
Securities Act].
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k ("Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration
Statement"), 771(a)(2) ("Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection with
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purchasers of securities with a private cause of action for
damages. 13 Section 11 provides a civil remedy in the case of a
registration statement that contains "an untrue statement of a
material fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading."'14 Section 12(a)(2) provides that any person who
offers or sells a security, by "means of a prospectus or oral
communication" that includes a material misstatement or
omission, is liable to her purchaser for rescission or damages.15
The SEC has authority under section 17 to seek equitable relief
against persons who offer or sell securities by means of
misleading statements. 16 While the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act")17 provides many statutory sections
regulating fraud,18 the most important one is section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.19 Rule 10b-5 is applicable to purchases and sales of
securities of all issuers, whether or not they have registered under
section 12 of the Exchange Act.20 "It applies to all securities
transactions in the primary and secondary markets where the
jurisdictional means ... are present."21
Prospectuses and Communications"), 77q ("Fraudulent Interstate
Transactions").
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(a)(2).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77q.
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)
[hereinafter Exchange Act].
18. Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act is aimed at broker-dealers, and section
16(b) regulates officers, directors, and more than 10 percent holders of equity
securities of a registered company. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c), 78p(b). Other
provisions are designed to protect specified transactions: section 9 (trading on
national stock exchanges); section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 (soliciting of proxies);
and section 14(e) and Rules 14e-1, 14e-2, 14e-3, and 14e-4 (tender offers). See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78n; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-9, 14e-1, 14e-2, 14e-3, and 14e-4 (2003).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
21. HICKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-8.
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B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Judicial Approaches to Foreign
Transactions
In relation to the application of the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws to securities transactions with
transnational aspects, Rule 10b-5 plays an important role.22
Among the antifraud provisions under the Securities Act, sections
11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which are applicable only to
fraud in the registration statement and to prospectuses pursuant
to a public offering respectively, no longer apply to transnational
transactions exempt under Regulation S.23 However, since Rule
10b-5 under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act covers all
transactions in the primary and secondary markets where the
jurisdictional means (e.g., the mails or instruments of interstate
commerce or communication) are present, transactions exempt
from section 5 under Regulation S still remain subject to Rule 10b-
5.24 The question remains, therefore, how far the reach of Rule
10b-5 extends to cover overseas transactions. Since, unlike
Regulation S, the SEC has not clarified the reach of Rule 10b-5
outside the United States, the extent of the reach of Rule 10b-5 has
22. See Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Transnational Aspect of U.S.
Securities Lazs, in 10C International Capital Markets and Securities Regulation
5-166 (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds., 1982 & Supp. June 2000)
[hereinafter Bloomenthal & Wolff, Transnational Aspect].
23. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905. "Regulation S limits the extraterritorial
application of the Securities Act by eliminating the registration requirements
for many offshore transactions and by providing greater predictability with
regard to the application of U.S. securities laws to offshore offerings." Uri
Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global
Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 241, 256 (1997).
24. Rule 10b-5 states:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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been left to the courts.25 Federal courts have sought to articulate
the extraterritorial coverage of the federal securities laws on a
case-by-case basis. 26 After grappling with the issue, federal courts
have sought to articulate the scope of coverage of the federal
securities laws. They have applied their own blend of
international law and their perception of the intent of Congress. 27
The courts have applied two primary tests, which are
sometimes referred to as the "effects" test and the "conduct" test.
The effects test determines whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists based solely on the effects of the transaction on American
investors or securities markets regardless of where the transaction
actually took place.28  Under the effects test, courts look to
whether alleged securities fraud occurring in foreign countries
has caused "foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the
United States." 29 Generally, courts determine whether or not
conduct outside the United States has a significant effect in the
United States on a case-by-case basis, and they tend to construe
the effects test in a relatively conservative manner.30
25. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous
Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 215-16
(1996) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality] (stating that
U.S. courts have grappled with the reach of 10b's extraterritorial application on
a case-by-case basis).
26. Since the area is an evolving one, attempts to synthesize the law are
tentative. Bloomenthal & Wolff, Transnational Aspect, supra note 22, at 5-166.
27. See Calhoun, supra note 10, at 688-89 (stating that statutory language
and legislative history can be evidence of Congress's intent to cast away the
presumption against extraterritoriality if principles of international comity are
not violated).
28. E.g., Calhoun, supra note 10, at 692; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (holding that section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 grants subject matter jurisdiction to U.S.
courts because extraterritorial transactions are injurious to U.S. investors).
29. Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984).
30. It is perhaps because American investors own at least a small part of so
many predominantly foreign companies, that courts are usually wary of
allowing a claim to proceed based solely on this fact. See Joshua G. Urquhart,
Comment, Transnational Securities Fraud Regulation: Problems and Solutions, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 475 (2000). For example, when American stakes in a foreign
investment trust amount to only 0.5% of the total investment, the impact of the
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The conduct test determines whether United States securities
laws enable courts to claim subject-matter jurisdiction based upon
the location of the conduct.31 The conduct test is based on the
principle of foreign relations law, which stipulates that a country
can assert jurisdiction over significant conduct within its
territory. 32  Under the conduct test, which is primarily a
territorial-based rule, jurisdiction is conferred on events based on
their location.33 The conduct test allows the U.S. judiciary to exert
more extraterritorial power over transnational securities
transactions, than does the effects test, because, even absent an
effect on U.S. investors, courts will sustain a claim if domestic
conduct contributes to the commission of fraud overseas.34 Under
the conduct test, although U.S. investors or U.S. investment
markets suffered no deleterious effects, federal courts have
jurisdiction where the conduct of the defendant in the United
States had some significance.35
While the effects and conduct tests have been used separately
by courts to assess subject-matter jurisdiction where the facts
require one test over the other, courts do not apply the conduct
test with the same degree of uniformity.36 In addition, some
courts have effectively combined the two tests. 37 The Second
alleged fraud was not substantial if someone in Europe defrauds the trust fund.
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016-17 (2d Cir. 1975).
31. Pismenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983);
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972); see MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 174 (5th
Cir. 1990) (holding that there must be an element of fraud or misrepresentation
infused in the transaction in order for U.S. courts to gain jurisdiction over
transactional conduct that occurs in the United States).
32. SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 3, at 178.
33. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 25, at 216.
Therefore, the issuer and investor can avoid the jurisdiction of a country simply
by moving their transaction abroad. Id.
34. Urquhart, supra note 30, at 475.
35. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-37
(2d Cir. 1972).
36. See HIcKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-20
to 12-24.
37. Id. at 12-24. Professors Choi and Guzman have also noted:
One difficulty with the conduct test is that of defining what actions count as
"conduct" for purposes of determining territoriality. In a securities
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Circuit addressed the issue of the conduct test and the effects test
in combined form in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.38 In Bersch,
Judge Friendly held that the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws apply in the following instances: (1) losses from sales of
securities to Americans residing in the United States even if no
significant acts (or culpable failures to act) occurred in the United
States; (2) sales of securities to Americans residing abroad if, but
only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in
the United States contributed significantly to their losses; and (3)
sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States if acts (or
culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused
their losses.39 Thus, "merely preparatory" acts are insufficient to
trigger jurisdiction when the injury is to foreigners located
abroad, but may be sufficient when the injury is to resident
Americans.40 The strict approach taken by the Second Circuit in
Bersch was later adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co.41
Other circuits, including the Third, Eighth and Ninth,
however, have adopted a broader standard for the assertion of
jurisdiction.42 For example, the Third Circuit modified the strict
approach taken by the Second Circuit into a loose one. In S.E.C.
v. Kasser,43 the court held that jurisdiction exists "where at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs
transaction, for example, many actions may lead up to the ultimate
transaction; telephone calls may cross jurisdictional boundaries, attorneys
may conduct cross-border investigations, and funds may flow internationally.
A workable conduct test, therefore, must specify the amount and type of
conduct that is necessary in order to trigger jurisdiction. U.S. circuit courts are
split on exactly how much conduct is necessary.
Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 25, at 216-17.
38. 519 F.2d 974 (2d. Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 993.
40. Id. at 992.
41. 824 F.2d 27, 30-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the D.C. Circuit Court
would follow the Second Circuit's approach articulated in Bersch).
42. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979) (granting jurisdiction where defendants' conduct
"furthered the fraudulent scheme" and was "significant with respect to the
alleged violation"); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir.
1983) (adopting the Eighth Circuit's test in Continental Grain).
43. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
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within this country."" Therefore, under this broader form of the
conduct test, even preparatory acts such as making initial phone
calls and soliciting potential foreign investors in the United States
may trigger jurisdiction.45
II. PROBLEMS WITH EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBJECT-MATFER
JURISDICTION
A. The Proprietyi of the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities
Laws
As was observed in Part I, U.S. courts have applied domestic
antifraud provisions extraterritorially to transactions in other
countries. While the purposes of extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws are rarely stated clearly,46 a conventional goal
is commonly put forth in defense of the extraterritorial reach of
the laws: to protect U.S. investors and to safeguard the integrity
of U.S. markets. 47 Traditionally, the SEC has imposed the U.S.
44. Id. at 114.
45. Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 25, at 217.
46. See RAVI C. TENNEKOON, THE LAW & REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE 380 (1991) (stating that it is difficult to predict when U.S. courts will
apply the provisions of U.S. securities laws extraterritorially); Choi & Guzman,
Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 25, at 219. The sparse legislative history
that addresses the extraterritorial reach of the federal securities laws is
indicative of the fact that Congress did not foresee the expansive globalization
of securities markets when it passed the securities laws. See Paul Hamilton,
Note, The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Securities Laws Tmoards Initial
Public Offerings Conducted over the Internet, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 343,
361 (1998).
47. See George C. Nnona, International Insider Trading: Reassessing the
Propriety and Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 185, 196 (2001); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968)
(stating that antifraud provisions are for "protection of investors"). Also, in
Securities Act Release No. 4708, the SEC stated:
[Tjhe Commission has traditionally taken the position that the registration
requirements of Section 5 of the Act are primarily intended to protect
American investors. Accordingly, the Commission has not taken any action
for failure to register securities of United States corporations distributed
abroad to foreign nationals... [I]t is immaterial whether the offering
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securities regime so as to protect U.S. resident investors from
making damaging securities decisions due to poor information.48
There are other policy arguments that show the strong
grounds for the extraterritorial application of antifraud rules in
the context of transnational fraudulent activities. First, the
expansion of the jurisdictional reach of federal securities laws is
needed for the deterrence of securities fraud in global markets.
As securities markets are integrated, internationalization
increases the potential for fraudulent activity in connection with
cross-border securities transactions.49 In order to ensure that the
United States does not become a "haven for such defrauders and
manipulators" of foreign securities, 0 extraterritorial application
of the antifraud rules is inevitable. Second, by vigorously
originates from within or outside the United States, whether domestic or
foreign broker-dealers are involved and whether the actual mechanics of the
distribution are effected within the United States, so long as the offering is
made under circumstances reasonably designed to preclude distribution or
redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United States.
Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of
Underwriters of Foreign Offerings as Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No.
4708, [1982 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1,361 (July 9, 1964)
[hereinafter Release No. 4708], available at 1964 WL 67885, at *1.
48. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 1973)
(stating that the purpose of antifraud provisions is to "protect investors from
deceptive schemes"); Assoc. Sec. Corp. v. S.E.C., 293 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir.
1961) (stating that the purpose of securities laws is to "protect investors");
Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 .F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1961)
(stating that Congress's intention in enacting the Securities Act was to protect
innocent purchasers of securities, and that its provisions must be interpreted in
light of that intent and purpose). This has been the position of most academic
commentators as well. See, e.g., J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors
under U.S. Securities Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition, 1
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 431, 432-33 (1994) (articulating reasons for
continuing regulatory practices that will protect the interests of ordinary
individual investors).
49. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International
Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1857
(1997) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, National Laws] (noting, for example, that
corporate insiders may seek to trade in countries where insider trading rules
are non-existent or rarely enforced).
50. S.E.C. v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977).
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policing transnational securities fraud, other nations will be
encouraged to work similarly to enforce their own securities
fraud rules to prevent cross-border fraudulent activities. 51
Finally, as to the concerns for a breach of comity and conflicts
with the sovereignty of other countries, commentators have noted
that enforcement of the antifraud provisions does not seriously
interfere with the economic or regulatory policies of a foreign
country.5 2 Generally, the extraterritoriality of U.S. antitrust laws
often presents conflict-of-law problems because the laws expose a
particular "economic doctrine" with distinct political conditions
which cannot be harmonized with a foreign country's economic
policies.53 Unlike antitrust law, however, the antifraud provisions
of U.S. securities laws have a minimal impact on another
country's economy because no foreign nation will want to
preserve the ability of its nationals to engage in fraudulent
transactions.54
In response to the arguments favoring the expansion of the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws, counter arguments
have been made. First, the extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities laws may give rise to a breach of international comitySS
51. Louise Corso, Note, Section 10(b) and Transnational Securities Fraud: A
Legislative Proposal to Establish a Standard for Extraterritorial Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 573, 603 (1989).
52. See Edward A. Taylor, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Basis for
Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: A Minimal Conduct Approach, 6 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 308, 328-29 (1983) (stating that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "causes
minimal impact on the economy of a foreign country" when applied in
transnational fraud cases).
53. Corso, supra note 51, at 603 n.215.
54. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 3, at 172; Corso, supra note 51,
at 603 n.215.
55. The doctrine of comity emphasizes restraint by nations in international
affairs. See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955). Comity, which is a fundamental element of international choice of
law, is used to explain why one state would give effect to the law of another.
The Supreme Court has described the principle of comity as follows:
[The principle of comity is] the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic
tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of
other sovereign states .... "Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
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as well as cause frequent conflicts with the sovereignty of other
countries. 56 For instance, when seeking to regulate investment
activity abroad, the United States cannot help but interfere with
the regulatory systems of other countries and compel foreign
banks and other institutions to reveal information that is
otherwise protected under the laws of their countries.57 These
conflicts may cause foreign countries to pass retaliatory
legislation of their own.58 Second, even if U.S. regulators are able
to obtain judgments against foreign-based parties, they may run
into problems enforcing such judgments outside the United
States.5 9  While extradition might be possible in some
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its laws.
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895)).
56. "Sovereignty" can be defined as the supreme political authority of an
independent state. Included in this concept is the idea that sovereignty is
fundamentally the ability of a country to enforce its own laws. See Felice B.
Friedman et al., Coordinating National Regulatory Standards and Enforcement
Mechanisms in the Global Marketplace, at 3, available at
http://www.law.nwu.edu/depts/contexec/cle/srgie/index-papers.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2003). While not every exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
will clearly conflict with the law of another nation, every assertion of U.S.
jurisdiction abroad encroaches upon the sovereignty of another national
government. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1310 n.1 (1985) [hereinafter
Harvard Note, Predictability and Comity].
57. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 914 (1998)
[hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity]; Nnona, supra note 47, at 198.
58. Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign
Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (1993). The retaliation has taken the
form of statutes designed to reverse the effect of a given U.S. statute, and the
legislation has been designed to protect transactions in the home country or
discriminate against U.S. business or business transactions. Various rules have
also aimed at preventing the intrusion of the U.S. litigation process. See id. at
571 n.262, n.263, and n.264.
59. Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, supra note 57, at 914.
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circumstances, it is an extreme approach.60  Third, the
extraterritorial application of the antifraud rules may lead to a
situation in which transactions involving U.S. investors could
trigger U.S. securities rules even in cases where the issuer
involved is already complying with some other country's
regulatory regime. These U.S. approaches would accordingly
produce undesirable results such as redundant and unnecessarily
costly systems of overlapping regulation, and would thereby
impede the free flow of capital across borders. 61 Fourth, since
extraterritoriality will not ensure predictability and certainty in
the application of securities laws, the parties involved in
transnational transactions might have difficulty in discerning the
jurisdictional consequences of their actions.62  Finally, no
consensus exists among other national regulators and market
participants as to what are fraudulent transactions.63  For
example, while some commentators argue for the continued
prohibition of insider trading, the case for prohibition is no longer
overwhelming and is at best on a par with the case for
deregulating it. 64  Under these circumstances, the continued
60. Extradition would likely involve litigation in foreign courts, thereby
negating or at least diluting the gains that come from invoking U.S. jurisdiction.
See Nnona, supra note 47, at 198.
61. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to
Substance, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 940 (2002). Many commentators recognize that
an efficient international securities market requires that nations limit the reach
of their laws. See Fisch, supra note 58, at 555-56.
62. See Corso, supra note 51, at 601 (noting that jurisdictional rulings are
largely determined by the predilections of the particular judge hearing the
case).
63. Nnona, supra note 47, at 214. This is most evident from the laxity with
which insider trading laws have traditionally been enforced in many of these
jurisdictions. Id.
64. For the arguments for prohibition of insider trading, see ROBERT C.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 265-68 (1986); William K. S. Wang, Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Aho Can
Sue Vhom under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1321 (1981)
(concluding that insider trading should be deterred and that Congress needs to
step in to ensure that insider trading is eliminated); R. J. Haft, The Effect of
Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1051, 1053-55 (1982) (noting that as information travels up the corporate
hierarchy it necessarily becomes distorted. However, eliminating the corporate
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expansion of U.S. jurisdiction over transnational fraudulent
transactions cannot be justified in global markets.
B. The Broad and Inconsistent Reach of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction
Aside from the arguments about the propriety of the
extraterritorial application of securities laws, there are other
problems with the current U.S. subject-matter jurisdiction over
transnational securities fraud. Because many of the significant
provisions of U.S. securities laws are interrelated with the term
"interstate commerce," which includes commerce or
communication between any foreign country and any state,65 an
argument can be made that U.S. securities laws can apply to any
transaction with "one end" in the United States. 66  Thus,
hierarchical system, and allowing insiders to trade on information as it becomes
available to them, will cause the information to stall at the level at which
insiders seek to capitalize on that information); D. A. Winslow & Seth C.
Anderson, From Shoeless Joe Jackson to Ivan Boesky: A Sporting Response to Lawo and
Economics Criticism of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 81 KY. L.J. 295, 321 (1993)
(arguing that corporate insiders should not be able to make trades based upon
inside information in order to ensure market purity); Mark Klock, Mainstream
Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Insider Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297,
333-35 (1994) (arguing, in part, that the economic data does not support the
proposition that prohibiting insider trading leads to economic inefficiencies).
For the arguments against prohibition of insider trading, see BARRY RIDER &
MICHAEL ASHE, INSIDER CRIME 3-4 (1993) (noting that in insider to purchaser or
seller transactions, there is no unfairness involved because neither party is
being misled because they both are privy to the same information); N. ARSHADI
& T.H. EYSELL, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE 132 (1993) (commenting that "the fairness argument fails to
provide an economically justifiable reason to prohibit insider trading" as open
market transactions necessarily lead to either a release of the insider
information or to its non-release-in which case no one is adversely affected).
65. See Securities Act § 2(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(7).
66. See SODERQUIsT & GABALDON, supra note 3, at 171. For example, section
5 of the Securities Act requires registration of all offers of securities, by U.S. or
non-U.S. companies, if the means of "interstate commerce" or the mails are
used in the United States, unless an exemption is available. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
Also, the principal fraud provision, such as Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, is
applied to all securities transactions in primary and secondary markets where
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theoretically and in practice, the reach of U.S. securities laws is
very far. Although the impact of the federal securities laws is
primarily limited by the self-restraint of the SEC and of U.S.
courts, 6 7 the potentially broad reach of the law has been
significantly criticized and denounced as a form of legal and
economic imperialism.68
Faced with the possibility of the broad reach of U.S. securities
laws, Regulation S was adopted by the SEC to clarify the
extraterritorial application of the registration provisions of the
Securities Act, and has partly accomplished the goal of finding
clear jurisdictional rules.69 One of the consequences of the law
prior to Regulation S was that U.S. investors found it difficult to
invest in issues made by foreign issuers, 70 because these foreign
issuers feared that the presence of a U.S. investor would trigger
mails or instruments of "interstate commerce" or communication are present.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
67. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, 1 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 1000 (2002).
68. Donald H. J. Hermann, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in Securities
Laws Regulation, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 207, 228 (1986) (commenting that U.S. courts
should restrain themselves from exercising jurisdiction "over parties who have
a reasonable basis for their belief that their conduct is in compliance with the
law of a foreign nation."); Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction of
American Courts Over Transnational Securities Fraud, 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 162 (1990)
(stating that U.S. courts' extraterritorial jurisdiction is unrestrained and
undermines the predictability and reasonableness necessary for effective legal
rules); Fisch, supra note 58, at 523-24 (noting that the expansive jurisdiction
which U.S. courts practice over essentially foreign transactions has proven
costly, as other countries have passed retaliatory legislation).
69. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 25, at 208.
70. Prior to the adoption of Regulation S, offshore transactions were
governed by the Securities Act Release No. 4708 and a significant, sprawling
body of no-action letters. Release 4708 attempted to limit the reach of U.S. law
by exempting from the registration requirements offerings that were sold in a
manner reasonably designed to preclude distribution or redistribution in the
United States or to nationals of the United States. Rather than relying on this
body of fact-specific no-action letters, however, most companies were
compelled to seek an individualized determination of the SEC's staff that their
particular offerings would not be deemed to occur in the United States.
Therefore, SEC no-action letters failed to give shape to the policy. Release No.
4708, supra note 47.
2003] MULTINAT'L ENFORCEM'T OF SECURITIES LAW
the expansive U.S. registration requirements. 71 Another concern
was the uncertainty as to when or under what circumstances
securities sold in an offering to non-U.S. persons could be resold
to either a person in the United States or a U.S. person outside the
United States.72 By providing guidance on which securities
transactions conducted outside the United States could come
under the reach of section 5, Regulation S reduced these
uncertainties. 73
Also, in adopting Regulation S, the SEC proposed a shift in
jurisdictional focus away from protection of U.S. investors,
wherever located, to the protection of the integrity of U.S. capital
markets.74 While this new approach still maintains the goal of
protecting certain investors from being poorly informed, it
reformulates the class of persons protected to consist of all
investors in U.S. market, wherever their residence, but only if
they purchase in U.S. markets.75 Thus, the SEC is embracing a
territorial approach to the extraterritorial application of the
Securities Act.76 No longer would the SEC view the protections of
71. Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global
Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 941 (1994). In effect, Americans abroad have
become pariahs in foreign markets because of the shadow of U.S. securities
laws -the "ugly Americans" of their time. See William J. Carney, Jurisdictional
Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 717, 721-22 (2001).
72. See Testy, supra note 71, at 941.
73. To address the broad jurisdictional reach of the registration
requirements of the Securities Act, Regulation S provides both an issuer safe
harbor and a resale safe harbor from the registration requirements of section 5
for certain offshore transactions. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905.
74. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6779, [1987-
1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,242, at 89,136 (June 10, 1988),
available at 1988 WL 239804.
75. Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure
Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 701 (1998).
76. Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep (CCH) 84,524, at 80,664 (Apr. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Release No. 6863],
available at 1990 WL 311658. While the SEC has not yet moved actual U.S.
practice significantly toward exclusive reliance on this approach, the mere
articulation of the capital market protection goal puts such exclusive reliance on
the agenda for discussion and raises the possibility that the SEC will make this
move in the future. Professors Choi and Guzman, for example, have recently
endorsed just such exclusive reliance on the transaction location approach. See
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section 5 as an American birthright, but rather as a protection
provided to those participating in U.S. capital markets. 77 For
registration purposes, provided that the requirements set forth in
Regulation S are satisfied, the SEC now chooses to rely upon the
laws in the jurisdictions in which the transactions occur rather
than upon the U.S. Securities Act. Thus, the SEC has stated: "The
territorial approach recognizes the primacy of the laws in which a
market is located. As investors choose their markets, they choose
the laws and regulations applicable in such markets."78 By
establishing a territorial approach to jurisdiction, therefore,
Regulation S presents domestic issuers with the possibility of
selling securities freely offshore while avoiding the registration
requirements of the Securities Act.79 Regulation S also reserves a
significant role for itself in bringing about comity and cooperation
among various regulatory regimes in global markets.80
Unlike Regulation S, however, the antifraud provisions still
have a great reach in the context of transnational securities fraud.
Since the SEC has not clarified the extraterritorial reach of
antifraud rules, the extent of the reach of the rules has been left to
courts, and courts have actively expanded their jurisdictional
coverage.8' Generally, the courts have not been uniform when
considering the extraterritorial application of the antifraud
provisions and the extraterritorial application of the registrations
provisions. In Bersch, for example, the Second Circuit stated that
"[i]t is elementary that the antifraud provisions of the federal
Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 25, at 221-23; Choi &
Guzman, National Laws, supra note 49, at 1894.
77. Edward F. Greene & Linda C. Quinn, Building on the International
Convergence of the Global Markets: A Model for Securities Law Reform, 1281
PLI/CoRP 11, 53 (2001).
78. Release No. 6863, supra note 76, at 80,665.
79. See Stephen J. Choi, The Unfounded Fear of Regulation S: Empirical
Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings, 50 DuKE L.J. 663, 665 (2000).
80. Testy, supra note 71, at 955. The SEC has stated: "Principles of cornity
and the reasonable expectations of participants in the global markets justify
reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States to define
requirements for transactions effected offshore." Thorn EMI plc, SEC No-Action
Letter, available at 1992 WL 56547, at *6 (Mar. 18, 1992).
81. See Matson, supra note 68, at 141 (noting that the present body of
securities fraud law is largely a product of the courts).
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securities laws apply to many transactions which are neither
within the registration requirements nor on organized American
markets."82 In fact, the reach of U.S. securities laws is interpreted
most narrowly when the need for registration under those laws is
at issue, and most broadly when the question presented involves
liability for violation of the antifraud provisions of the laws.83
This approach is quite sensible because no foreign nation will
have a strong interest in preserving the ability of its nationals to
engage in fraud, 84 and countries should be free to adopt national
rules that they feel are most advantageous to them.85
The problem here is that the antifraud provisions are applied
by the courts on an ad hoc judicial decision-making basis, not by
clear rules that the legislative or executive branches have
formulated.86  Generally, if Congress intends to extend the
82. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See also Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d
252, 262 (2d Cir.) modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939
(1989) (noting that "the antifraud provisions of American securities laws have
broader extraterritorial reach than American filing requirements."); IIT v.
Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing for jurisdiction because the
antifraud sections of the securities laws were implicated and not the
registration provisions); Charles J. Johnson Jr., Application of the Federal Securities
Laws to International Securities Transactions, 45 ALB. L. REV. 890, 925-26 (1981)
(stating that the courts and the SEC are more likely to exercise jurisdiction over
cases implicating the antifraud provisions than they are with cases that involve
"more technical provisions").
83. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 3, at 172. The Second Circuit
stated that "the antifraud provisions of American securities law have broader
extraterritorial reach than American filing requirements." Consol. Gold Fields
PLC, 871 F.2d at 262.
84. See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 3, at 172. Fraudulent practices
discourage potential investors and issuers of new stocks or bonds, which has
the effect of decreasing the liquidity of the affected stock exchange. Gunnar
Schuster, Extraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis of
Jurisdictional Conflicts, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165, 172 (1994).
85. Choi & Guzman, National Laws, supra note 49, at 1894. Sovereign states
are able to choose to have their laws apply extraterritorially. Andrew T.
Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEo. L.J. 883, 926 (2002).
86. Testy, supra note 71, at 958. If the benefit to a country applying its law
extraterritorially is substantial, the legislature can apply the law to conduct that
takes place abroad, as long as it defines the precise reach of the statute.
Guzman, supra note 85, at 926.
108 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
jurisdiction of U.S. courts beyond domestic borders, the language
of a statute must provide some indicia of that intent.87 Also,
federal jurisdiction over securities claims is predicated upon
specific congressional grants of jurisdiction. 88 However, since the
Exchange Act provides no express guidance for the
extraterritorial application of section 10(b) to foreign transactions,
courts have to ascertain the congressional intent underlying the
antifraud provisions of the Act.89  Unfortunately, legislative
history deals almost exclusively with domestic markets and the
protection of investors in those markets, not international
markets.90 The Exchange Act does not explicitly address possible
civil and criminal penalties for individuals who act within the
United States but who affect foreign securities markets, or for
individuals who act outside the United States but who affect U.S.
securities markets.91 Thus, each court has had to struggle with
the difficult issue of the extraterritoriality of securities laws
without congressional guidance, expanding or limiting its
jurisdictional coverage according to its individual whims, instead
of questioning the indeterminate and unrestrained reach of the
tests.92 This lack of clear guidance has resulted not only in the
87. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1991)
(holding that the extraterritorial reach of Congressional statutes should be
inferred from boilerplate language within the statute).
88. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (granting U.S. district courts and state courts
jurisdiction over offenses and suits brought in violation of the '33 Act and the
'34 Act, respectively).
89. See Matson, supra note 68, at 144-45.
90. See Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1977)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b and concluding that Congress' intent in enacting the
securities laws was "to protect the integrity of domestic securities markets in a
particular stock"). Since Congress in 1929 "could not have foreseen the
thoroughly interconnected global marketplace" that the Exchange Act would
come to regulate, "the legislative silence on the issue of the extraterritorial reach
of the Act is hardly surprising." Katherine J. Fick, Comment, Such Stuff as Laws
Are Made on: Interpreting the Exchange Act to Reach Transnational Fraud, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 447-48 (2001).
91. Matson, supra note 68, at 141-42.
92. Id. at 142, 161-62. The U.S. Supreme Court also has not granted
certiorari in any of the major cases addressing the determination of
extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 573
F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); S.E.C. v. Kasser, 548
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tendency of U.S. courts to give the antifraud rules too broad a
scope, but also in inconsistent standards for the determination of
subject-matter jurisdiction. As a result, parties involved in
transnational transactions cannot reasonably predict the
jurisdictional consequences of their actions. 93 Although it can
hardly be doubted that the United States is eminently qualified to
assume a leadership role in international securities regulation, the
decisions of U.S. courts could catalyze international discord and
injury to U.S. markets. 94
Furthermore, along with the excessive and inconsistent scope
of extraterritorial application, the current effects and conduct tests
have their own problems.95 For example, the main problem with
the conduct test in the context of global markets is defining what
actions count as "conduct" for the purposes of determining
territoriality.96 U.S. courts are divided on the nature of the
conduct that must occur in the United States to sustain the
assumption of jurisdiction. 97 Also, when a fraudulent securities
transaction is perpetrated extraterritorially through the Internet,
the conduct test often cannot be met because no acts directly
causing the loss have been committed within the United States. 98
One problem with the effects test is that, given the state of
F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), modified on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
93. Corso, supra note 51, at 576.
94. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW, § 27:24; MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION:
DAMAGES § 27:2 (2002).
95. See Corso, supra note 51, at 576 (stating that Congress needs to pass
legislation that will bring stability and predictability to the practice of applying
U.S. securities' laws extraterritorially).
96. Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, supra note 57, at 913.
97. See id. There is sharp disagreement among the circuit courts about the
precise degree of domestic conduct to allow a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction. Calhoun, supra note 10, at 681. See also HICKS, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-21 to 12-22.
98. See Michael A. Collora & David M. Osborne, Extraterritorial jurisdiction
in Cyberspace, at http://dwyercollora.com/articles/mc-extra.asp (last visited
Sept. 19, 2003).
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information technology today, the potential reach of the effects
test could be too broad.99 Also, since it is unclear to what extent
the effects test is applicable, participants involved in transnational
transactions do not know what constitutes a substantial effect or
what behavior abroad might affect U.S. securities. 100
III. THE CURRENT PROCEDURAL CONTROLS OF SUBJECT-MATTER
JURISDICTION
The risk of being sued through the extraterritorial application
of U.S. securities laws is a serious one because of the burdens it
often imposes on foreign defendants.101 In response to the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. jurisdiction, foreign parties may raise
certain kinds of judicial and private procedural defense. 02
However, while these kinds of defense may control U.S. courts'
discretionary and extensive jurisdiction to some degree, they can
also be obstacles to the effective regulation of transnational
securities fraud.
A. Forum Selection and Choice of Law Provisions
U.S. courts may have difficulty in gaining subject-matter
jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud when private
99. One commentator argues that there is nothing in the effect test used by
U.S. courts to prevent its application, proposing a situation as follows:
An American citizen can visit a free internet website, run from a server
stationed in Egypt, and effect stock transactions which ultimately prove
detrimental to his interests. Although he visited the web site without any
invitation or prior notice to the owner (the website being open to all comers),
the U.S. courts can sustain their jurisdiction under the effect test by arguing
that the harm to the citizen is a harm to U.S. interests.
See Nnona, supra note 47, at 197-98.
100. John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S.
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud
Provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 493
(1997).
101. Robert S. De Leon, Some Procedural Defenses for Foreign Defendants in
American Securities Litigation, 26 J. CORP. L. 717, 718 (2001).
102. These procedural defenses include forum selection, choice of law
provisions, forum non conveniens, and international comity. Id. at 718, 731.
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parties have attempted to settle jurisdictional issues and choice-
of-law matters by pre-dispute contract provisions. 103 "Cases of
this type raise the issue of private ordering" -a forum selection
or arbitration clause in a contract in which the plaintiff identifies
a forum outside the United States as the place for resolving any
dispute between the parties.104
Since section 14 of the Securities Act and section 29 of the
Exchange Act expressly declare "void" any agreement to waive
the substantive protections of their respective statutes, the
validity of choice-of-law agreements between U.S. investors and
foreign issuers is affected by these provisions. 105 Also, due to the
U.S. securities laws' character as public law, courts tend to apply
their own national law, rather than the law of a foreign nation, so
as to protect public interests that go beyond those of the
litigants.106 However, many courts have found an exception to
these positions by enforcing pre-dispute agreements where there
are significant foreign elements in a transaction that is subject to
the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.107 In Scherk v. Alberto-
103. See HICKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-39.
104. See id. at 12-40.
105. See Securities Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n; Exchange Act § 29, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc.
106. See CoX, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 5, at 1236-37. In regard to
the securities regulations' character as public law, see Amir N. Licht,
International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to
Convergence, 20 CARDOzo L. REV. 227, 245-63 (1998). After analyzing the
relation between corporate law and securities law, Licht concludes that "the
wide penumbra in each field should not obstruct the observation that these
fields have a solid, determinable core consisting of private and public law,
respectively." Id. at 263.
107. See HICKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-40.
See also, e.g., Stamm v. Barclays Bank, 153 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding
the validity of a choice clause, which mandated that any dispute litigated in
England was to be governed by English law); Lipcon v. Underwriters At
Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the court
"will declare unenforceable choice clauses only when the remedies available in
the chosen forum are so inadequate that enforcement would be fundamentally
unfair."); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998)
(upholding a choice clause and noting that failure to recognize choice clause in
favor of U.S. jurisdiction based on the securities acts would lead to an
unbounded reach of the U.S. securities laws); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium
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Culver Co., the Supreme Court enforced an arbitration agreement
in a securities case arising out of an international contract.108 The
Court stated that contractual provisions specifying the law to be
applied to resolve any future disputes are an "indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to international business transactions." 109  Put
differently, considerations that go against applying foreign
securities laws chosen by the parties to govern their disputes
rather than U.S. laws are different in an international context."0
Thus, in Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's,"' the Court stated:
We conclude that the available remedies and potential damage
recoveries suffice to deter deception of American investors
and to induce the disclosure of material information to
investors. It is true that enforcement of the Lloyd's clauses
will deprive plaintiffs of their specific rights under § 12(1) and
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. However, the fact that an
international transaction may be subject to laws and remedies
different or less favorable than those of the United States is not
alone a valid basis to deny enforcement of forum selection,
arbitration and choice of law clauses.... Given the
international nature of the transactions involved here, and the
availability of remedies under British law that do not offend
the policies behind the securities laws, the parties' forum
selection and choice of law provisions contained in the
agreements should be given effect .... 112
Inv. P'ship, 740 F.2d 148, 160 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding a motion to dismiss
which was predicated upon the fact that the parties agreed that disputes would
be decided by a Dutch court implementing Dutch law); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (upholding a pre-dispute forum-
selecting arbitration clause partly on grounds that trade and commerce in
world markets requires U.S. courts to refrain from exercising their jurisdiction
in certain instances); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)
(stating that "in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding
international trade we conclude that the forum clause should control absent a
strong showing that it should be set aside.").
108. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
109. Id. at 516.
110. De Leon, supra note 101, at 728.
111. 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 162.
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When cases involve sophisticated business professionals who
are engaged in activities that have only an attenuated connection
to the United States, the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses would be given effect."1 However, when identifying a
significant "public" interest in the outcome of these forum
selection cases, the courts may find that these types of private
decisions are "contrary to the policies of the federal securities
laws and, therefore, refuse to enforce them."' 14 For example, if an
inexperienced private U.S. investor is adversely affected by pre-
dispute agreements, U.S. courts are more likely to disregard any
choice-of-law clause by applying the public policy reservation
embodied in U.S. law, and use the traditional effects and conduct
tests for U.S. subject-matter jurisdiction over securities
transactions."5
B. Forum Non Conveniens
In the context of disputes over transnational securities fraud,
the doctrine of forum non conveniens could offer foreign
defendants a procedural device to avoid U.S. jurisdiction.116 The
doctrine of forum non conveniens empowers a court vested with
jurisdiction to decline to exercise that jurisdiction over a
particular dispute when the chosen forum is so inconvenient that
it would be unfair to conduct the litigation in that place."7 Chief
Judge Breyer stated:
To insist that American courts hear cases where the balance of
convenience and the interests of justice require that they be
brought elsewhere will simply encourage an international
forum-shopping that would increase the likelihood that
decisions made in one country will cause (through lack of
113. Schuster, supra note 84, at 170.
114. HICKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-40.
115. Schuster, supra note 84, at 170.
116. See HicKs, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-39.
117. Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1991); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("The principle of forum non
conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.").
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awareness or understanding) adverse effects in another,
eroding uniformity or thwarting the aims of law and policy. 18
Given such a view, if an adequate alternative forum for
action is available in another country, the action may be
dismissed without prejudice based on a balancing of several
private and public factors concerning each forum.119 However,
because of these numerous factors for deciding the application of
the doctrine and the discretionary nature of the doctrine itself, it
is very difficult to predict the application of forum non conveniens.
While there is some case law that has dismissed securities actions
against foreign issuers on pure forum non conveniens grounds,1 20
courts are often reluctant to dismiss such actions on these
grounds. 121 By directing litigation, in which American interests
are low, into the courts of the country with the greatest interest,
forum non conveniens often reduces the court's workload and
protects the American taxpayers' pocketbooks.122
118. Howe, 946 F.2d at 950.
119. The Supreme Court set forth the following factors. The private factors
include: (1) "relative ease of access to sources of proof;" (2) "availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the costs of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses;" and (3) all of the issues that make trial of a
case "easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. The
public factors include: (1) "the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion;" (2) "local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home;" (3) "the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the law that must govern the action;" and (4) "the unfairness of
burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty." Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981).
120. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41, 45-49 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
the district court had not abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint
on forum non conveniens grounds).
121. See, e.g., DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 232 F.3d 49, 67 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that courts " must defer to plaintiff's choice because unless the balance
strongly favors defendant, plaintiffs' choice of forum 'should rarely be
disturbed."'); Allstate Life Ins. v. Linter Group, Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1001 (2d Cir.
1993) (noting that absent certain public and private interest factors, there is a
presumption "in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum."); Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1344 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that
"extreme circumstances" should exist before a court dismisses a claim on forum
non conveniens grounds).
122. De Leon, supra note 101, at 730.
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C. International Comit_
Comity can be referred to as the deference that the courts of
the United States will pay to another nation's laws or
judgments.123 One court stated that "[t]he decision of a foreign
tribunal is to be accorded comity where that court properly
exercised jurisdiction and where its ruling does not violate the
public policies of the forum state."24 Another court defined the
doctrine of comity as "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws."125
A case may be dismissed on grounds of international comity,
at the discretion of the court, when "it is shown that the foreign
court is a court of competent jurisdiction, and that the laws and
public policy of the forum state and the rights of its residents will
not be violated."26 Although the doctrine of comity and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens are often considered concurrently
because both doctrines share similar principles, comity retains its
vitality as an independent doctrine that may warrant dismissal of
an action concerning international securities fraud in at least a
narrow class of cases. 27
D. Jurisdiction and Venue
"U.S. securities laws can be applied to persons and securities
transactions only where the regulator, the arbitrator, or the
court... has jurisdiction over the subject matter and... the
123. See Bruce D. Angiolillo, The Power of the Federal Courts to Hear Securities
Fraud Claims Arising from International Transactions, 1136 PLI/Corp 469, 502
(1999).
124. Pogostin v. Pato Consol. Gold Dredging, Inc., No. 79 Civ. 5433 (S.D.N.Y.
March 23, 1981), available at 1982 WL 1613, at *3 (citations omitted).
125. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 998-99 (2d Cir.
1993) (quoting Hilton v. Guyton, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
126. Id. at 999 (citations omitted).
127. Angiolillo, supra note 123, at 504.
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person."128 Unlike the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction for a
non-judicial forum, the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction for
U.S. courts over transnational fraudulent transactions is not well
established. 129 Also, even if a particular forum has subject-matter
jurisdiction over a dispute, it must have jurisdiction over the
person alleged to have violated an antifraud rule.130 For personal
jurisdiction, each defendant must have "minimum contacts" with
the United States.13' Minimum contacts exist when defendant is
(1) doing business in the United States; (2) doing an act in the
United States; or (3) causing an effect in the United States by an
act done elsewhere.132 The most successful and frequently used
basis for asserting personal jurisdiction in securities actions is a
situation in which a defendant has caused injury in the United
States as a direct or foreseeable result of wrongdoing alleged to
have occurred outside the United States and has purposefully
availed itself of U.S. commerce. 33 "It is not sufficient for a
plaintiff in a transnational lawsuit to prove that the foreign
defendant is personally present at trial or that the defendant was
properly served with a legal complaint."134 As to the venue of the
128. HiCKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIEs REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-6.
129. The scope of subject matter jurisdiction for a non-judicial forum is well
established because it rests on a contractual basis which all parties to a dispute
recognize as binding. Id. at 12-7.
130. Id. at12-3.
131. De Leon, supra note 101, at 719.
132. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340
(2d Cir. 1972) (applying the Restatement (Second) of Conflict Laws' § 27 factors
for a court to balance when attempting to exercise jurisdiction over an absent
individual).
133. De Leon, supra note 101, at 721; see also, e.g., McNamara v. Bre-X
Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634-35 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that the court
had personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants because they knew or
should have known that their actions would give U.S. courts jurisdiction over
them); Edias Software Int'l, LLC v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (holding that "when intentional actions are expressly aimed at the
forum state and cause foreseeable harm to the defendant [sic], jurisdiction in
the forum state exists."); Leonard A. Feinberg, Inc. v. Cent. Asia Capital Corp.,
936 F. Supp. 250, 256-57 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that when defendants
purposefully directs harmful actions at a forum "the necessary minimum
contacts" exist for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant).
134. HICKS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 6, at 12-4.
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action, section 27 of the Exchange Act provides that a proper
venue for any securities litigation may be "in any [federal
judicial] district where any act or transaction constituting the
alleged violation occurred ... or where the defendant is found or
[resides] or transacts business." 135 In addition to the provisions of
section 27, section 1391(d) of the Judicial Code states that an alien
may be sued in any district.136 Thus, these relevant provisions
make venue proper wherever personal jurisdiction exists. 37
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBJECT-
MATTER JURISDICTION
It is difficult to determine whether extraterritorial application
of securities laws is desirable in the context of international
securities transactions, because the arguments for both expanding
and restricting extraterritoriality have a certain validity.138
Considering the problems with the current view of the U.S.
jurisdictional reach, however, there is no strong basis for
maintaining the present scope of the antifraud provisions in
global markets. The aggressive and inconsistent judicial response
to transnational securities fraud has not ensured predictability in
the application of antifraud rules, for that response has made it
hard for the parties involved in transnational transactions to
discern the jurisdictional consequences of their actions.139 Also,
the current U.S. approach to the extraterritoriality of antifraud
rules seems to have failed to adapt to the needs of international
commerce and international harmony.140 Even though fraud is
widely recognized as a tort, most industrialized countries have
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).
137. De Leon, supra note 101, at 725.
138. Corso, supra note 51, at 604.
139. See id. at 601-04 (commenting that an expansive application of the
securities laws jurisdictional reach will not result in predictability and clarity
but will have the opposite result when trying to determine when U.S. courts
will exercise jurisdiction, which will cause foreign parties to avoid even
minimal contacts with the United States).
140. Norimasa Murano, Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 298, 321 (1984).
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significant differences in their views of what constitutes
fraudulent transactions and market practices. 141  Moreover,
attempts to unilaterally police ever greater portions of
international markets would destroy the good will toward
cooperation as well as respect for the rules, customs, and
practices of foreign markets, which are essential to the growth of
an international legal and financial community. 142 Since the
current procedural controls of subject-matter jurisdiction have
their own limits, it is more desirable to seek reforms that afford
U.S. regulators the opportunity to control transnational fraud in
some circumstances, but not in others.143
In order to avoid the problems related to the unclear scope
and the excessively expansive reach of the antifraud provisions, it
is necessary for regulators to find clear jurisdictional rules that
strictly limit the extraterritoriality of antifraud rules and provide
unambiguous means for both investors and issuers to decline to
be a part of the U.S. regulatory system.44 The exercise of subject-
matter jurisdiction over transnational transactions involves
significant policy implications, including international political
harmony and market efficiency. 45 In determining jurisdictional
coverage, for example, the legitimate concerns of other nations
should be recognized so that the United States does not interfere
with the ability of foreign nations to prescribe rules of conduct for
its citizens.146 Also, since the predictability and reasonableness
are necessary for effective laws, especially in an international
setting, the extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions
should be shaped to place foreign parties on notice as to when
they face liability under U.S. laws.147 In addition, because U.S.
interests alone should not determine the proper limits on
extraterritorial jurisdiction, U.S. policy must reflect the interests
141. See id. at 317.
142. Matson, supra note 68, at 166.
143. Nnona, supra note 47, at 245.
144. Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 25, at 208.
145. Testy, supra note 71, at 958.
146. Matson, supra note 68, at 166.
147. Id. at 162, 168. Predictability not only ensures basic fairness to all
defendants, but also prevents retaliation by other nations. See Harvard Note,
Predictability and Comity, supra note 56, at 1321.
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of all nations involved.14 Therefore, when applying judicial tests
to cross-border transactions, courts have to balance the political
sensitivities and market efficiency concerns inherent in questions
of the extraterritorial application of antifraud rules.149 However,
courts are not well suited to analyze these delicate issues and
balance the interests of a foreign sovereign against the interests of
the United States.150 Institutionally, courts are poorly equipped to
handle concerns about U.S. policy raised by extraterritoriality
because (1) courts are becoming overburdened with more
frequent and complex cases as to the scope of antifraud rules151;
(2) courts have limited access to the complex market information
that is involved in transnational securities cases 52; and (3) courts
have a judicial overriding bias toward investor protection.153 Due
to these institutional constraints, courts are ill-suited to the task of
148. See Matson, supra note 68, at 163; Harvard Note, Predictability and
Comity, supra note 56, at 1320. As Schuster also points out:
There is a set of rules to protect property ownership and to provide for the
definition of property rights, and these rules are essential for the protection of
sovereign interests. Thus, they have been incorporated into public
international law. These rules operate according to the following principles:
(1) the illegality of the use of force; (2) the principle of non-intervention; (3)
the principle of the equality of states; (4) the principle of the peaceful
settlement of disputes; and (5) the obligation to observe a minimum standard
for human rights. These rules are enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations
Charter, in international human rights covenants, and in customary public
international law.
Schuster, supra note 84, at 177-78.
149. See Testy, supra note 71, at 929.
150. See Fisch, supra note 58, at 566; Reins. Co. of Am. v. Administratia
Asigurarilor de Stat. (Admin. of State Ins.) 902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (describing the balancing test as "an approach that
calls on the district judge to throw a heap of factors on a table and then slice
and dice to taste"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F.Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) ("Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise... to
evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign country ... [iut is simply
impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally contradictory and mutually
negating actions.").
151. Testy, supra note 71, at 928-29.
152. See id. at 958.
153. See id.
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resolving the overlapping legal, economic, and political concerns
involved in the application of antifraud rules.154
This Article accordingly affirms the proposition that
Congress should grapple with the issue of extraterritoriality and
provide federal courts with clear guidance as to the
extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions.155  In other
words, the inherent difficulty of requiring courts to analyze
extraterritoriality on a case-by-case basis, to consider the relevant
policy implications, and to weigh the interests of the United
States and a foreign sovereign requires a legislative solution.156
Also, in light of the increase in transnational activities, it is
necessary for Congress to establish a jurisdictional framework
that adds stability to trading in global securities markets.5 7
As for finding a clear scope for extraterritorial subject-matter
jurisdiction, it should start with the goals of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act-namely, the protection of American investors
and the integrity of U.S. securities markets. That is to say, the
application of the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws is
essential to protect domestic markets and investors. If the
standards that Congress provides place excessive limits on or
deny existing benefits to future plaintiffs, there will be a
significant danger of undermining the goals of U.S. securities
laws.158
On the other hand, the author of this Article believes that
along with the need for a clear statement of the scope of subject-
matter jurisdiction, a more restrained approach for
extraterritoriality is needed in an internationalized securities
marketplace. Too broad a scope for subject-matter jurisdiction
154. See id.; see also, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 949
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that courts are not qualified to evaluate "purely
political factors"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F.Supp. at 1148 (stating that
courts do not have the expertise to evaluate the economic policies of a foreign
country); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1963)
(discussing the Act of State doctrine whereby the judicial branch declined to
pass on the validity of acts taken by foreign governments).
155. Corso, supra note 51, at 576; Testy, supra note 71, at 929.
156. Fisch, supra note 58, at 573-75.
157. Corso, supra note 51, at 576.
158. KAUFMAN, supra note 94, § 27:9.
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would do harm to the establishment of the effective and
cooperative scheme of transnational securities regulation that
most countries seek. Thus, in determining the guiding principles
and rules for applying antifraud rules extraterritorially, Congress
should take the position that the protection of U.S. investors and
U.S. markets must be balanced by various policy concerns. This
balance can be achieved by limiting the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by a U.S. court to situations in which the interests of
U.S. investors and U.S. markets are sufficiently involved in
foreign transactions and in which activities abroad truly impact
U.S. markets.15 9 Put differently, Congress should reconcile the
goals of equity and efficiency with a healthy respect for the rules,
customs, and practices of foreign markets.160
Furthermore, when providing clear standards for the scope
of extraterritoriality, Congress should not ignore the merits of the
current effects and conduct tests utilized by federal courts.
Although the current scope of extraterritorial subject-matter
jurisdiction for federal courts has not been settled, the effects and
conduct tests of the courts give us practical approaches to decide
a reasonable scope for extraterritoriality. Thus, as regards the
scope of extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction, this Article
recommends modified and narrowed effects and conduct tests
as follows.
First, when a foreign transaction is not intended to produce
effects in the United States but actually does produce certain
effects in the United States, federal courts would have
extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction over the transaction,
provided that the defendants have engaged in some action or
conduct within the Unites States. Since a certain investment-
related action somewhere else in the world could have an adverse
effect on other countries whose securities markets are
technologically linked, a lot of countries would justly try to
exercise their own subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.
Thus, in order to limit broad and overlapping subject-matter
159. Choi & Guzman, National Lazvs, supra note 49, at 1894.
160. Testy, supra note 71, at 955, 958; Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 4,
at 1200 (stating that "[it is fundamental to the law of nations that each
country's respective laws apply only to transactions within its borders.").
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jurisdiction, jurisdiction should be exercised by a country where
some action has occurred and adverse effects were felt. However,
federal courts would have extraterritorial subject-matter
jurisdiction over a foreign transaction that was intended to
produce and did in fact produce substantial effects in the United
States alone, regardless of whether an action or a certain kind of
conduct actually occurred in the United States.
Second, extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction based on
the conduct test alone should not come into play as regards
actions initiated by private parties. Under the current conduct
test, a significant act or a certain kind of conduct in the United
States will lead to the application of the antifraud rules, even if
only foreign investors or markets are harmed. Foreign
purchasers of securities in a foreign transaction thus far have
initiated actions in U.S. courts based on the current conduct test.
However, it is no longer justifiable for U.S. courts to exercise
subject-matter jurisdiction extraterritorially in cases in which no
U.S. investors or U.S. markets suffer losses. The person who has
actually suffered losses and who resides abroad could bring a suit
in the courts of the country where fraudulent transactions
occurred, or in the courts of his home country. Since one of the
main purposes of the antifraud rules is to compensate investors
harmed by deceptive foreign transactions, U.S. courts would not
have to devote precious resources to foreign parties at the
expense of comity when there are no U.S. interests at stake.
There would be, of course, exceptional cases. For instance,
while there may be no U.S. interests involved in foreign
transactions and no effects felt in the United States, there may be
concerns that the United States is being used as a haven for the
export of fraudulent security devices. In that case, federal courts
would have subject-matter jurisdiction over the fraud claims
based on the conduct test alone. This exception to subject-matter
jurisdiction, however, should be allowed only in antifraud actions
brought by the SEC because such actions should be restricted to
determining policy issues; they should not be open to private
plaintiffs who could initiate frivolous suits. In this case, Congress
would determine by legislation when exercising subject-matter
jurisdiction is justified. For example, a statute could provide that
U.S. courts would have subject-matter jurisdiction when a
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defendant committed all elements of a violation within the
United States, or when material conduct within the United States
directly caused the loss-in this case, the statute could define
what "material conduct" is.
Third, federal courts would have extraterritorial subject-
matter jurisdiction over fraud claims including sales of securities
to either a U.S. citizen residing in the United States or a foreigner
residing in the United States. If the antifraud provisions of
federal securities laws were applied in an instance where
securities were sold to a U.S. citizen residing abroad or a
foreigner residing outside the United States, the scope of
extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction would be too broad, for
U.S. investors or foreign investors who made securities
transactions outside the United States would not expect the
protection of U.S. securities laws. This proposal corresponds to
the recent approach of the SEC, which placed more emphasis on
the protection of the integrity of U.S. markets than on the
protection of U.S. investors. Investors who transact abroad
would expect protection from the laws of the country in which
the transaction took place.
Finally, when private parties want to settle fraudulent
matters by pre-dispute contract provisions, courts should
withhold the exercise of this subject-matter jurisdiction. By doing
this, the extraterritorial application of the antifraud rules could be
minimized, and parties involved in cross-border securities
transactions could predict the jurisdictional consequences of their
actions. In other words, federal courts should take into account
the costs and benefits of exercising their jurisdiction, withholding
it in circumstances in which U.S. interests are weak and the
incentive for restraint is powerful.
Even if Congress provides the judiciary with clear standards
as to the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions, it is the
courts that finally interpret and apply the rules to the real
transnational disputes. According to the above proposals, for
example, even if Congress defines the term "substantial effects"
or "material conduct," the content of these terms would take
concrete shape only through application by the courts. Also,
there are several factors U.S. courts may consider in the matter of
the application of antifraud rules, and the principles of
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international law could be a device to aid them in the resolution
of interpretative questions since cross-border fraud involves
international elements.161 In short, in order to operate in harmony
with other nations in international markets, U.S. courts must
tolerate the different standards of other sovereign countries and
be sensitive to the potential negative effects of excessive
expansion of subject-matter jurisdiction.1 62
CONCLUSION
In regard to the regulation of transnational securities fraud,
U.S. courts have applied two major tests in determining the reach
of extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction: the effects test and
the conduct test.163 The effects test determines whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists based on the effects of transactions on
U.S. investors or securities markets, regardless of where the
transaction actually took place.64 The conduct test determines
whether U.S. securities laws enable courts to claim subject-matter
jurisdiction based upon the situs of the conduct.16 5 The conduct
test thus focuses on the nature of the conduct within the United
States as it relates to alleged fraud under the federal securities
laws.66 Where fraud has usually been alleged, federal courts
have been quite generous towards the United States in their
interpretation of U.S. securities laws. While the SEC has taken a
number of steps to define the scope of disclosure requirements
with respect to foreign companies and to conduct that occurs
primarily abroad, the reach of the antifraud provisions remains a
matter for the courts to resolve. 67
The current scope of extraterritorial federal jurisdiction,
however, is inconsistent and excessively expansive, which has
resulted in conflicts with other countries as well as the potential
for redundant and unnecessarily costly systems of overlapping
161. KAUFMAN, supra note 94, § 27:9.
162. Corso, supra note 51, at 600; Murano, supra note 140, at 321.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 26-44.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
166. See id.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
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regulation. Also, given the possibility of being sued as a result of
the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud provisions,
participants in cross-border transactions need an identifiable
standard to guide their actions. Therefore, it is necessary for U.S.
courts to find clear jurisdictional rules that strictly limit the
extraterritoriality of the antifraud provisions and provide
unambiguous means for both investors and issuers to decline to
embrace the U.S. regulatory system.
In response to the extraterritorial reach of subject-matter
jurisdiction, foreign parties may raise some types of judicial and
private procedural defenses.168 However, while these defenses
may exert some needed control on U.S. federal courts'
discretionary and extensive jurisdiction to some degree, they
could also be obstacles to the effective regulation of transnational
securities fraud.16 9
Because courts are not well suited to analyze the various
delicate issues related to the application of antifraud rules, this
Article has explained and supported the proposition that
Congress should grapple with the issue of extraterritoriality and
provide the judiciary with clear guidance as to the proper reach
of the antifraud provisions. Moreover, believing that the current
effects and conduct tests of the courts give us practical
approaches to decide the reasonable scope of extraterritoriality,
this Article has made some recommendations for the scope of
extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction by suggesting modified
and narrowed effects and conduct tests. Under the recommended
proposals, plaintiffs who initiate actions based on the effects test
would have to be either U.S. citizens residing in the United States
or foreigners residing in the United States. U.S. courts would also
have extraterritorial subject-matter jurisdiction based on the
conduct test, but only when an action was brought by the SEC. In
short, in determining the guiding principles and rules for
applying antifraud rules, Congress should take the position that
the protection of U.S. investors and U.S. markets must be
balanced by policy issues such as international political harmony
and market efficiency.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 101-37.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
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